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The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
is one of two documents arising from the negotiation process 
initiated with the New York Declaration for Refugees and Mi-
grants, unanimously adopted on 19 September 2016 by the 
United Nations General Assembly1). On the one hand, Annex I 
to this Declaration gave the UNHCR (United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees) the task of drafting a “Global Compact 
on Refugees” to be presented to the UN General Assembly 
in the annual report for 2018: this document was effectively 
approved on 17 December 2018 with 181 votes in favour2). 
On the other hand, Annex II established an intergovernmental 
negotiation coordinated by the IOM (International Organiza-
tion for Migration)3), in order to draw up a “Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, intended to create a 
“framework for comprehensive international cooperation on 
migrants and human mobility”, covering all aspects of interna-
tional migration, including “human rights-related aspects”4). 
This compact had a more complex gestation process and after 
being adopted on 10 December 2018 at the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference held in Marrakech5), was endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly on 19 December 20186), with 152 votes in 
favour, 5 votes against (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, 
Poland, United States) and 12 abstentions7).
The Preamble to the New York Declaration contains a very 
important statement, also taken up in the Global Compact on 
Migration8), namely that “refugees and migrants have the same 
universal human rights and fundamental freedoms”9) (while 
acknowledging however that “their treatment is governed by 
separate legal frameworks”). Although this seemed to pave 
the way for overcoming the distinction between migrants and 
refugees10), in practice the decision to produce two distinct 
pacts accentuates this dichotomy, even if in reality the dif-
ferences are not so clear-cut. Although this distinction does 
preserve the peculiarity of the specific protection offered 
by international law to those who fall within the definition of 
refugee, pursuant to Art. 1 of the Geneva Convention on the 
status of refugees, it nevertheless presents certain risks. As 
noted, “it may fail to engage with the way in which migration 
control practices bear down particularly heavily on refugees 
and would-be refugees, who have to cross borders (often many) 
in search of protection”11). The risk is that – for people in need 
of international protection, but not covered by the definition of 
refugee – the demand for border control prevails over protec-
tion obligations. As pointed out12), although both the New York 
Declaration and the Compact on Migration contain references 
(implicit or explicit) to the principle of non-refoulement, “yet 
they do little to address one of the most pressing problems for 
many non-removable people – their lack of formal legal status 
and security of residence”:
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1) New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/
RES/71/1.
2) Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (2018). For a critical 
analysis of this document see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “The Unfinished 
Work of the Global Compact on Refugees”, in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 2018, Vol. 30, pp. 611 ff., https://academic.oup.com/
ijrl/article/30/4/611/5258096.
3) On the role of IOM see in particular Cristina Carletti, Marco Borrac-
cetti, “Il Global Compact sulla migrazione: tra scenari internazionali 
e realtà europea”, in Freedom Security and Justice: European Legal 
Studies, No. 2/2018, pp. 24 ff.
4) See https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration.
5) UNGA, Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Draft outcome document of 
the Conference, A/CONF.231/3.
6) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc. 
A/RES/73/195.
7) Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liech-
tenstein, Romania, Singapore, and Switzerland. In addition, 24 UN 
Member States were not present to take part in the vote (Afghanistan, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Guinea, 
Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Micronesia, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Vanuatu). To sum up, 41 of 
the 193 UN Member States did not endorse the Compact.
8) Para. 4 GMC. “Refugees and migrants are entitled to the same 
universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which must be 
respected, protected and fulfilled at all times. However, migrants and 
refugees are distinct groups governed by separate legal frameworks. 
Only refugees are entitled to the specific international protection 
defined by international refugee law.”
9) Para. 6 New York Declaration.
10) See on this point Giuseppe Cataldi, “La distinzione tra rifugiato e 
migrante economico: una dicotomia da superare”, in Giuseppe Nesi 
(a cura di), Migrazioni e diritto internazionale: verso il superamento 
dell’emergenza? Atti del XXII Convegno SIDI, Napoli, 2018, pp. 585 ff., 
and literature quoted therein.
11) Cathryn Costello, “Refugees and (Other) Migrants: Will the Global 
Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility for Refugees?”, 
in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 30, 2018, p. 644, 
https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/
eey060/5288417. See on this point ex multis Violeta Moreno-Lax, 
Accessing Asylum Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refu-
gee Rights Under EU Law, Oxford, 2017 and literature quoted therein.
12) Cathryn Costello, “Refugees and (Other) Migrants”, cit., p. 646.
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15) See Alessandra Camilli, Francesca Spinelli, “Che cos’è il Global 
compact e perché l’Italia vuole rimanerne fuori”, in Internazionale, 




b5aca60a1e14.html. However, as pointed out, a prior pronouncement 
by Parliament does not appear to be necessary to adopt a document 
which, like the GCM, is not an international treaty (see Andrea Spag-
nolo, “Di intese segrete e alibi parlamentari: tra la decisione del TAR 
sull’Accordo col Niger e il Global Compact sulle migrazioni”, in SIDIBlog, 
5 December 2018, http://www.sidiblog.org/2018/12/05/di-intese-
segrete-e-alibi-parlamentari-tra-ladecisione-del-tar-sullaccordo-col-
niger-e-il-global-compact-sulle-migrazioni).
17) Camera dei Deputati, mozione 1/00113, https://aic.camera.it/aic/
scheda.html?numero=1-00113&ramo=C&leg=18. See on this point 
Fulvio Cortese, “The Global Compact and national legislation:quid 
iuris?”, in Questions of International Law, 30 April 2019, p. 27, http://
www.qilqdi.org/the-global-compact-and-national-legislation-quid-
iuris/.
18) Para. 7 GCM. On the non binding force of the Compact see Anne 
Peters, “The Global Compact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?”, 
in European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 21 November 2018, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-global-compact-formigration-to-sign-or-
not-to-sign/; Alessandro Bufalini, “The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration: What is its contribution to International Migra-
tion Law?”, in Questions of International Law, 30 April 2019, pp. 5 ff., 
http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regu-
lar-migration-what-is-its-contribution-to-international-migration-law/.
19) Para. 7 GCM. On the question of whether the GCM has “governance 
potential – a capacity which may move it beyond the mere ‘interna-
tional cooperation framework’”, see Marion Panizzon, Daniela Vitiello, 
“Governance and the UN Global Compact on Migration: Just another 
Soft Law Cooperation Framework or a New Legal Regime governing 
International Migration?”, in European Journal of International Law: 
Talk!, 4 March 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/governance-and-the-un-global-
compact-onmigration-just-another-soft-law-cooperation-framework-or-
a-new-legal-regime-governinginternational-migration/ more-16947.




22) Vincent Chetail, International Migration Law, Oxford, 2019, p. 333.
23) For a detailed analysis of the objectives see “The UN’s Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration:  Analysis of the 
Final Draft and Monitoring Implementation”, in Elspeth Guild, Tugba 
Basaran (eds.), Refugee Law initiative Blog, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/
themed-content/global-compact-for-migration/.
After a brief analysis of the content and genesis of the Global 
Compact on Migration, this article intends to focus on its role 
in the light of human rights, as recognized by the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and other international instruments.
2. Genesis and Content of Global Compact on Migration
The process of drafting the Migration Compact involved vari-
ous phases and was guided by Mexico and Switzerland as co-
facilitators. Initial informal consultations, held with numerous 
stakeholders in order to gather information, were followed by 
formal intergovernmental negotiations. In December 2017, in a 
note13) addressed to the General Secretariat of the United Na-
tions, the United States announced that they would abandon 
the negotiations on the Global Compact on Migration, because 
the global approach in the New York Declaration would not be 
compatible with its own sovereignty. Following this abandon-
ment, the European Union took a leading role in the process 
of drawing up the Global Compact, although there were further 
defections, even among the member countries of the European 
Union. Indeed, in July 2018, after the withdrawal of Australia, 
it was the turn of Hungary, which justified its choice because 
“For the UN migration should be encouraged, while according 
to Hungary it has to be stopped”. Hungary was followed by 
the other countries of the Visegrád group (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) and Austria, Bulgaria and Italy.
The evolution of the Italian attitude is emblematic of the use of 
a refusal to sign the Global Compact for the sake of propagan-
da. Indeed, although Italy had taken part in all the negotiation 
phases and, until 21 November 201814), had publicly declared 
its support for the agreement through the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in office at that time, in the end it withdrew. In fact, after 
the stance taken on 27 November 2018 by the then Interior 
Minister, Matteo Salvini, who declared that he was against 
the Global compact because it would put so-called economic 
migrants and political refugees15) on the same level, Prime 
Minister Giuseppe Conte stated that the Government would 
not take part in the Marrakech summit, and that Parliament 
would examine the question of Italy’s signing the Compact16). 
In February 2019 the Italian Parliament decided not to sign 
the Migration Compact17).
The Migration Compact establishes “a non-legally binding18), 
cooperative framework”19) that intends to tackle migration 
“in all its dimensions”20). It seems particularly important to 
highlight the Preamble, which states not only that migrations 
have always been present in the course of history, but explicitly 
states that they constitute “a source of prosperity, innovation 
and sustainable development in our globalized world, and 
that these positive impacts can be optimized by improving 
migration governance”, adding that “No country can address 
the challenges and opportunities of this global phenomenon 
on its own”. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for International Migration, Louise Arbour, affirmed, 
the Migration Compact represents a great achievement for 
multilateralism21), which is particularly important in the cur-
rent historical period. Indeed, as pointed out22), “the Compact 
paves the way for a counter-narrative to the populist rhetoric 
through a balanced, consensual, and inclusive approach”.
The Global Compact on Migration consists of a Preamble, 10 
Guiding Principles (some aspects of which are difficult to bal-
ance, National sovereignty – lett. C – and Human rights – lett. 
F, to name but two), plus 23 Objectives and, finally, 2 sections 
dedicated to implementation and follow-up, to be carried out 
within the International Migration Review Forum, where, every 
four years from 2022 onwards, the member states of the 
United Nations, will be able to discuss the results achieved. 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) will act as 
coordinator and secretariat for all monitoring activities.
The 23 Objectives23) include: 1. Collect and utilize accurate 
and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based poli-
cies. 2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors 
that compel people to leave their country of origin.3. Provide 
accurate and timely information at all stages of migration; 
4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and 
adequate documentation. 5. Enhance availability and flexibility 
of pathways for regular migration. 6. Facilitate fair and ethi-
cal recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent 
work. 7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration. 
8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts 
on missing migrants. 9. Strengthen the transnational response 
to smuggling of migrants. 10. Prevent, combat and eradicate 
trafficking in persons in the context of international migration. 
11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated 
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24) On the role of the European Union see Elspeth Guild, Katharine T. 
Weatherhead, “Tensions as the EU Negotiates the Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, in EU Immigration and Asylum 
Law and Policy, 6 July 2018, eumigrationlawblog.eu/tensions-as-the-
eu-negotiates-the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-andregular-migration/; 
Daniela Vitiello, “Il contributo dell’Unione europea alla governance 
internazionale”, cit.; Giuseppe Cataldi, Adele Del Guercio, “I Global 
Compact su migranti e rifugiati. Il Soft Law delle Nazioni Unite tra spinte 
sovraniste e potenziali sviluppi”, in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 
No. 2/2019, pp. 204 ff., https://www.dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.
it/saggi/400-i-global-compact-sumigranti-e-rifugiati-il-soft-law-delle-
nazioni-unite-tra-spinte-sovraniste-e-potenzialisviluppi. On the position 
of Latin America States see Camila Barretto Maia, Diego Morales, Raisa 
Ortiz Cetra, “Global Compact for Migration: stop the hypocrisy and listen 
to the Global South”, 27 February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/en/global-compact-for-migration-stop-hypocrisy-an/.
25) See Daniela Vitiello, “Il contributo dell’Unione europea alla govern-
ance internazionale dei flussi di massa di rifugiati e migranti: spunti per 
una rilettura critica dei Global Compacts”, in Diritto, Immigrazione e 
Cittadinanza, No. 3/2018, p. 121, https://www.dirittoimmigrazionecit-
tadinanza.it/saggi/304-saggio-vitiello/file.
26) See, for example, the Secretary General’s proposal at the Davos 
Forum in 1999: Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Hu-
man Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum 
in Davos, Press Release SG/SM/6881, 1999.
27) Daniela Vitiello, “Il contributo dell’Unione europea alla governance 
internazionale”, cit., p. 21.
28) Italian Non-Paper – Migration Compact. Contribution to an EU 
Strategy for External Action on Migration, http://www.governo.it/sites/
governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf.
29) This approach is however problematic because by resorting to 
arrangements which do not fall within the scope of Article 218 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States 
and EU institutions circumvent political and judicial mechanisms of 
control (those of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, 
respectively): on this point see Anna Liguori, Migration Law and the 
Externalization of Border Controls. European State Responsibility, 
London and New York, 2019, p. 66, and literature quoted therein.
30) In the same direction see EU Input to the UN Secretary-General’s 
Report on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, Making Migration Work for All, UN Doc. A/72/643,12. 12. 2017, 
p. 1; see also EU Priorities at the United Nations and the 73rd United 
Nations General Assembly (September 2018 – September 2019), Doc. 
10056/18, 25. 6. 2018, p. 3.
31) On the different position of Latin America States see Camila 
Barretto Maia, Diego Morales, Raisa Ortiz Cetra, “Global Compact 
for Migration: stop the hypocrisy and listen to the Global South”, cit.
32) On EU Member States positions vis-à-vis GCM see Sergio Carrera/
Karel Lannoo/Marco Stefan/Lina Vosyliūtė, “Some EU governments 
leaving the UN Global Compact on Migration: A contradiction in terms?”, 
in CEPS Policy Insights, No. 2018/15, November 2018, www.ceps.eu/
system/files/PI2018_15_SCKLMSVL_UN%20Global%20Compact_0.
pdf; Mauro Gatti, “EU States’ Exit from the Global Compact on Migra-
tion: A Breach of Loyalty”, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and 
Policy, 14 December 2018, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/eu-states-
exit-from-the-global-compact-on-migration-abreach-of-loyalty/; Evelien 
Wauters, Jan Wouters, The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration: Some Reflections, Leuven Centre for Global Gov-
ernance Studies, Working Paper No. 210 – February 2019, https://
ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2018/wp210-
wouterswauters.pdf.
33) At para. 6.
34) The footnote indicates: International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.
manner. 12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migra-
tion procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and 
referral. 13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last 
resort and work towards alternatives. 14. Enhance consular 
protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migra-
tion cycle. 15. Provide access to basic services for migrants. 
16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion 
and social cohesion. 17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination 
and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape per-
ceptions of migration. 18. Invest in skills development and 
facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and com-
petences. 19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas 
to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries. 
20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances 
and foster financial inclusion of migrants. 21. Cooperate in 
facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well 
as sustainable reintegration. 22. Establish mechanisms for the 
portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits. 
23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partner-
ships for safe, orderly and regular migration.
As mentioned before, when the USA declared that they would 
no longer participate in the negotiation, the European Union, 
which had been invited to take part on the basis of its observer 
status at the General Assembly of the United Nations, actually 
acquired a leading role and exercised influence, both in form 
and substance, in the drafting of the final document24).
Indeed, the form of the Global Compact on Migration shows 
marked similarities with the documents adopted by the Euro-
pean Union in order to implement the European Agenda on 
Migration25). Although the term Global Compact is not entirely 
new within the United Nations26), its use in relation to the final 
product of an intergovernmental negotiation process is quite 
innovative27). The most significant precedents are to be found 
rather in the European regional framework: one example is the 
Italian proposal of Migration Compact, of 15 April 201628), 
another the Communication of the Commission establishing 
a new Partnership Framework with third countries of 7 June 
2016 – COM (2016) 385 final29). In particular, the partnership 
established by the Commission’s 2016 Communication calls 
for the use of compacts and follows the trend of adopting 
tools softer than treaties, in order to obtain effective and 
rapid results30).
As for substance, the European Union has aimed to emphasize 
the distinction between regular and irregular migrants, and in 
general shown itself much more interested in border control 
and in affirming the obligations of readmission of States of 
origin than in recognizing migrants’ rights31).
In the end the position of EU Member States was split: although 
the majority voted in favour, three States (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland) voted against, one (Slovakia) did not vote, 
five (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Romania) abstained32).
3. Global Compact on Migration and human rights
The Global Compact on Migration places great emphasis 
on human rights. First of all, the statement “Refugees and 
migrants are entitled to the same universal human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which must be respected, protected 
and fulfilled at all times”, already contained in the New York 
Declaration33), is reiterated at para. 4 of the Global Compact, 
further strengthened by the call for an “overarching obligation 
to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of migrants, 
regardless of their migration status” (at para. 11); furthermore, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and “the other 
core international human rights treaties”34) are expressly 
referred to (at para. 2) and human rights are among the “guid-
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the UN Global Compact on Migration and the SDGs 2030 to forge 
a new path for the protection of migrants’ rights” (video available 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqY-iYMjrJg&list=PL-kiEIc_ 
8yhTcvUm1251aQ1heHh1KwIOd&index=21&t=0s).
38) Tullio Scovazzi, “Some Cases in the Italian Practice relating to Illegal 
Migration at Sea”, in International Law and the Protection of Humanity 
(Pia Acconci et alia eds), Leiden, 2017, pp. 196 ff.
39) The Italy-Libya MoU is not an isolated case, but a small piece of a 
larger scenario. Indeed, over the past decades, the European Union 
has been implementing various strategies of externalized border 
controls: see Anna Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of 
Border Controls, cit.
40) See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 1 December 
2016, Doc. S/2016/1011, http://undocs.org/S/2016/1011; the report 
of the UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), released on 13 December 2016, http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehuman-
ised_en.pdf; European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya 
Initial Mapping Report, January 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2017/jun/eu-eeas-strategic-review-libya-9202-17; Human 
Rights Watch World Report 2017, January 2017, https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2017/country-chapters/libya.
41) See for instance the fatal accident of 6 November 2018 (a video is 
available at: https://sea-watch.org/en/clarification-on-theincident-of-
november-6th). On 8 May 2018 a claim was brought before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by 17 survivors against Italy “over 
its coordination of Libyan Coast Guard pull-backs resulting in migrant 
deaths and abuse”: http://www.glanlaw.org/single-post/2018/05/08/
Legal-action-against-Italy-overits-coordination-of-Libyan-Coast-Guard-
pull-backs-resulting-in-migrant-deathsand-abuse; on this case see 
Moritz Baumgärtel, “High Risk, High Reward: Taking the Question of 
Italy’s Involvement in Libyan ‘Pullback’ Policies to the European Court 
of Human Rights”, in European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 
14 May 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/high-risk-high-reward-taking-
the-question-of-italys-involvement-in-libyan-pullback-policies-tothe-
european-court-of-human-rights/.
42) See Martina Ramacciotti, “Sulla utilità di un codice di condotta 
per le organizzazioni non governative impegnate in attività di search 
and rescue (SAR)”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, Vol. 101, 2018, 
pp. 213 ff.; Federico Ferri, “Il Codice di condotta per le ONG e i diritti 
dei migranti: fra diritto internazionale e politiche europee”, in Diritti 
umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, pp. 189 ff.
43) The Open Arms case was emblematic: on this point see Francesca 
De Vittor, “Soccorso in mare e favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione 
irregolare: sequestro e dissequestro della nave Open Arms”, in Diritti 
umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, pp. 443 ff.
44) See Giuseppe Cataldi, “Migranti nel Mediterraneo e tutela dei 
diritti. Alcuni casi recenti della prassi italiana”, in Quaderni di econo-
mia sociale, No. 2/2018, pp. 33 ff., https://www.sr-m.it/wp-content/
uploads/woocommerce_uploads/2018/11/QES_2_18.pdf. The Italian 
policy of closing ports and criminalizing NGOs has been criticized by 
the United Nations and the Council of Europe: see Francesca Can-
cellaro, “L’Italia è sotto osservazione dell’ONU con riferimento alla 
criminalizzazione del soccorso in mare, alla politica dei porti chiusi 
ed al decreto immigrazione e sicurezza”, 12 marzo 2019, in Diritto 
penale contemporaneo, 2018, https://www.penalecontemporaneo.
it/d/6525-l-italia-e-sotto-osservazione-dell-onu-con-riferimento-alla-
criminalizzazione-del-soccorso-in-mare _ftn1; Stefano Zirulia, “Soccorsi 
in mare e porti sicuri: pubblicate le raccomandazioni del Commissario 




45) Decree of 14 June 2019, No. 53 (G.U. No. 138 of 14 June 2019). 
See Irini Papanicolopulu, “Tutela della sicurezza o violazione del 
diritto del mare?”, in SIDIblog, 26 June 2019, http://www.sidiblog.
org/2019/06/26/tutela-della-sicurezza-o-violazione-del-diritto-del-
mare/, and the hearings before the Chamber of the Deputies of the 
Italian Parliament of Giuseppe Cataldi, Francesca De Vittor e Cesare 
Pitea, available at: https://www.camera.it/leg18/1132?shadow_ 
primapagina=9263&fbclid=IwAR0bwpMzC_ntbezKfZInwqi_vDVxJ6b-
4fME8XTcGh6WpM3K73wS1k5-tfOw. On the first application of this 
decree see Lorenzo Gradoni, Luca Pasquet, “Lisistrata a Lampedusa: 
una riflessione sul caso Sea Watch 3”, in SIDIblog, 6 July 2019, 
http://www.sidiblog.org/2019/07/06/lisistrata-a-lampedusa-una-
riflessione-sul-caso-sea-watch-3/.
ing principles” on which the Global Compact on Migration is 
based. Finally, para. 41 reiterates: “the Global Compact is to 
be implemented in a manner that is consistent with our rights 
and obligations under international law” (and therefore also in 
conformity with international human rights law).
Numerous references35), both to human rights in general and 
to specific rights36), are also contained in many points of the 
pact. Here it seems appropriate to focus on two objectives in 
particular: objective No. 8 and objective No. 13.
Objective 837), entitled “Save lives and establish coordinated 
international efforts on missing migrants”, says:
24. We commit to cooperate internationally to save lives and prevent 
migrant deaths and injuries through individual or joint search and 
rescue operations, standardized collection and exchange of relevant 
information, assuming collective responsibility to preserve the lives of 
all migrants, in accordance with international law. We further commit 
to identify those who have died or gone missing, and to facilitate com-
munication with affected families.
It seems particularly significant that an explicit objective has 
been dedicated to this topic, in the light of the practices of 
recent months of some European states, with the culpable 
silence, if not the explicit support, of the European Union itself. 
An example is the evolution, or rather involution, of Italian 
practice, which has gone from the laudable Mare Nostrum38) 
operation to alignment with the much more restricted opera-
tion Triton within the European Union. Furthermore, in February 
2017, Italy concluded a Memorandum with Libya39), which was 
made delegated to intercepting migrants at sea and pulling 
them back, despite the risk of torture and all sorts of abuses 
in Libyan detention centers – already known before the stipu-
lation of the aforementioned agreement40) – and despite the 
fact that Libyan Coast Guard rescue procedures are often in 
open violation of the obligation to rescue and of the right to 
life41). At the same time, hostility has been growing towards 
NGOs (crucial protagonists of thousands of rescue operations 
at sea), from the adoption of a questionable code of conduct42), 
and certain controversial legal actions43), up to the closure of 
ports44) and the latest changes to the so called security decree 
bis, openly aimed at hindering NGO rescue operations45).
In light of this, the measures indicated in the Migration Com-
pact seem particularly important; in order to achieve its goal 
of saving lives at sea, the Compact identifies, among neces-
sary actions: developing procedures and agreements “with 
the primary objective of protecting migrants’ right to life, that 
uphold the prohibition of collective expulsion, guarantee due 
process and individual assessments” and also ensuring that 
assistance to migrants for exclusively humanitarian reasons 
is not considered illegal.
35) See Elspeth Guild, “The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration: What Place for Human Rights?”, in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 30, pp. 661 ff., https://academic.oup.com/
ijrl/article/30/4/661/5281365, che ne individua 45.
36) For instance the rights of the child: see objectives Nos. 8, 11 
and 21.
37) On this objective see Syd Bolton, Catriona Jarvis, “GCM Commen-
tary: Objective 8: Save lives and establish coordinated international 
efforts on missing migrants”, in Refugee Law Initiative Blog, 18 October 
2018, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/10/18/gcm-commentary-
objective–8/. For an analysis of this objective in the light of the current 
migration crisis see Bernard Ryan’s talk “The Migration Crisis and 
International Law”, at the Conference held in Leicester on 22 March 
2019 “Migrants’ Rights at a Crossroads. Seizing the Moment(um) of 
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46) See Andrea Spagnolo, “We are tidying up”, cit.; Alessandro Bufalini, 
“The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, cit.
47) Second Draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration (28 May 2018), https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/ sites/
default/files/180528_draft_rev_2_final.pdf.
48) Alessandro Bufalini, “The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration”, cit., p. 17.
49) https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-State-
ments/china.pdf.
50) “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, member-ship of a particular social group or political opinion”.
51) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also 
contains an explicit prohibition of refoulement at Article 19.
52) On the principle of non-refoulement in human rights treaties see 
Adele Del Guercio, La protezione dei richiedenti asilo nel diritto inter-
nazionale ed europeo, Napoli, 2016, and literature quoted therein.
53) See ex multis Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Jane McAdam, Refugee in In-
ternational Law, 3rd Ed., Oxford, 2007, pp. 353 ff.; Elihu Lauterpacht, 
Daniel Bethlehem, “The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
refoulement: Opinion”, in Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Erika Feller, 
Volker Turk, and Frances Nicholson eds.), Cambridge, 2003, pp. 89 ff.
54) With regard to externalization and GCM see also Marion Paniz-
zon, Daniela Vitiello, “Governance and the UN Global Compact on 
Migration: Just another Soft Law Cooperation Framework or a New 
Legal Regime governing International Migration?”, in European 
Journal of International Law: Talk!, 4 March 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/
governance-and-the-un-global-compact-onmigrationjust-another-
soft-law-cooperation-framework-or-a-new-legal-regime. The authors 
highlight the risk that the GCM, in providing multiple interconnections 
between different actors, does not offer adequate guarantees against 
abuses:“If refashioned as a tool of conditionality by State practice, 
this “interconnectedness” may cast non-migration specific policies 
– such as trade, development aid, security policy – as kickbacks to 
reward countries of the Global South that are willing to sign up onto 
the externalization of migration policies by border shifting, pull-backs 
and other non-arrival cooperative strategies“. For the authors the risk 
is therefore that these interconnections may become „a catalyst for 
externalization“.
55) See Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 26 February 2018, 
Doc. A/HRC/37/50.
56) See also Anna Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of 
Border Controls, cit., pp. 3 ff.
57) See Justine N. Stefanelli, “GCM Commentary: Objective 13: Use 
immigration detention only as a measure of last resort and work 




59) Para. 27 lett. g) of Zero Draft.
60) Italics added.
Certainly, an explicit reference to the prohibition of refoule-
ment46) – like that of the previous draft47) – would have been 
appreciated (in the final text a reference to this principle has 
been maintained only within objective No. 21, which deals with 
returns). As pointed out48), the elimination in the final text of 
article 8 seems to have been due to the position of certain 
States: indeed, the position of the Chinese representation is 
emblematic – according to them “since migrants and refugees 
fall under different legal categories, the non-refoulement prin-
ciple should not be applied to migration issues”49). However, 
the refoulement prohibition, which was introduced by Art. 33 
of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees50), was 
subsequently not only explicitly envisaged in human rights trea-
ties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition 
of Torture, in Art. 351), but also inferred from the prohibition 
of torture both by the European Court of Human Rights and 
by the Human Rights Committee52); moreover, according to 
prevailing doctrine this principle has acquired the status of 
customary law53).
It is worth noting also lett. b) of Objective 8, which says: “Review 
the impacts of migration-related policies and laws to ensure 
that these do not raise or create the risk of migrants going 
missing, including by identifying dangerous transit routes 
used by migrants …” A human-rights oriented interpretation 
of this paragraph could only lead to the recognition of the il-
legitimacy not only of criminalizing NGOs, but also of the most 
recent practices of externalization54), the so-called “pullbacks”, 
provided for by the aforementioned Italy-Libya agreement 
of 2 February 2017. In this regard the words of Nils Melzer, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment, in his report of 
26 February 201855), are enlightening: “… while both retaining 
States and supportive destination States often portray ‘pull-
backs’ as humanitarian operations aiming to ‘rescue’ migrants 
in distress from overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels at sea, 
or to prevent them from embarking on such ‘unsafe journeys’, 
or to ‘defeat the business model of smugglers and traffickers’, 
the well-documented reality is that intercepted migrants are 
generally returned to their port of departure, where they are 
routinely detained or further deported to unsafe third States 
and, in both cases, exposed to a substantial risk of torture and 
ill-treatment, or even death, without access to an assessment 
of their protection needs or any other legal remedy”56).
Objective No. 13 (“Use of immigration detention only as a 
measure of last resort and work towards alternatives”) con-
cerns one of the most prejudicial practices, namely detention, 
and reads verbatim:
29. We commit to ensure that any detention in the context of inter-
national migration follows due process, is non arbitrary, is based on 
law, necessity, proportionality and individual assessments, is carried 
out by authorized officials and is for the shortest possible period 
of time, irrespective of whether detention occurs at the moment of 
entry, in transit or in proceedings of return, and regardless of the 
type of place where the detention occurs. We further commit to 
prioritize non-custodial alternatives to detention that are in line with 
international law, and to take a human rights-based approach to any 
detention of migrants, using detention as a measure of last resort 
only.
This clear statement is followed by a detailed list of actions, 
all to be pursued in line with the principles of due process 
and human rights. Overall, objective No. 13 “is quite a strong 
and positive statement of standards that should apply to im-
migration detention”57). Furthermore, if we compare the rule 
provided in the Zero Draft and that contained in the final text, 
there are some improvements58). Among these noteworthy 
revisions are point a), which requires independent monitoring 
of immigration detention; d), which establishes the right to a 
regular review of detention orders; f), providing for the right of 
all migrants to be informed about the reasons for their deten-
tion, in a language they understand.
Sadly, however, one amendment concerning the detention of 
minors has moved in the opposite direction: while the Zero 
Draft included59), among its recommended actions: “Uphold 
the protection and the rights of the child at all times, with 
respect to their migration status, by ending60) the practice of 
child detention in the context of international migration, and 
providing alternatives to detention …”, the final text opts for 
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61) Italics added.
62) Para. 29 lett. h) of final text.
63) Indeed, soft law can contribute to the development of hard law: see 
on this point ex multis Christine Chinkin, “Normative Development in 
the International Legal System”, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment 
and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International 
Legal System, Oxford, 2003, p. 31; Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The Role 
of Soft Law in a Global Order”, ivi, pp. 100 ff. With specific regard to 
the Global Compact for Migration see Anne Peters, “The Global Com-
pact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?”, cit.; Alessandro Bufalini, 
“The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, cit., in 
particular pp. 18 ff.
64) See Nora Markard, “The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on 
EU Migration Control by Third Countries”, in European Journal of 
Migration and Law, 2016, pp. 591 ff.; Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing 
Asylum Europe, cit., pp. 341 ff.; Elspeth Guild, Vladislava Stoyanova, 
“The Human Right to Leave Any Country: A Right to Be Delivered”, in 
European Yearbook on Human Rights, 2018, pp. 373 ff.
65) Elspeth Guild, Tugba Basaran, Kathryn Allinson, “From Zero to 
Hero? An analysis of the human rights protections within the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)”, in Interna-
tional Migration, 2019.
66) Indeed, as pointed out (see Elspeth Guild, Katharine T. Weather-
head, “Tensions”, cit.), “Article 9 of the Directive might indeed require 
for a postponement of removal of migrants with irregular status, when 
for the listed reasons they cannot be removed from a Member State, 
but it does not provide them with a regular status in the (potentially 
indefinite) meantime”.
67) The case Ahmed v. Austria (judgment of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights of 17 December 199) is emblematic: although the applicant 
was successful before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court 
found that the applicant’s deportation to Somalia would breach Article 
3 of the ECHR), he was left without status in Austria and committed 
suicide 15 months after the ECHR decision.
68) Italics added.
69) Para. 11 GCM.
70) François Crépeau, “Towards a Mobile and Diverse World: ‘Facilitat-
ing Mobility’ as a Central Objective of the Global Compact on Migration”, 
in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 30, 2018, p. 651, https://
academic.oup.com/ijrl/article/30/4/650/5250652.
71) Jane McAdam, “The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration: 
A New Era for International Protection?”, in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol. 30, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/arti-
cle/30/4/571/5435574, p. 571.
72) GCM, para. 14.
a much softer “working to end61) the practice of child deten-
tion in the context of international migration”62). Although the 
existence of a customary rule prohibiting detention of minors 
cannot be stated at the present time, the Global compact could 
have been an important opportunity to favor the progressive 
development of international law in such a delicate matter63).
4. Concluding remarks
Overall, the Migration Compact is essentially limited to recog-
nising existing rights and the opposition it has met is justified 
more by reasons of political propaganda than purely legal 
ones. Indeed, a comparison between the final document and 
the initial draft shows that, with some exceptions, some im-
portant points have been either eliminated (e.g. the prohibition 
of the detention of minors and the reference to regularization 
procedures) or cut back (e.g. family reunification), while other 
rights, absent in the initial draft, continue to be ignored in the 
final draft too, including the right to leave any country, which 
is certainly particularly at risk due to the current practices of 
externalization64). In addition, as pointed out, in some cases 
respect for human rights is subject to the States’ political will 
and conditions of vulnerability are tolerated65). A blatant ex-
ample is the situation of people who have no legal status but 
cannot be expelled. Certainly, the importance attached to the 
distinction between regular and irregular migrants provided for 
in the GCM confirms the limbo reserved for all those who live 
in a grey area between these two categories and – if we focus 
on European law in particular – are not adequately protected 
either under the EU Return Directive66) or under the European 
Convention on Human Rights67).
However, despite these problems, in my opinion the impor-
tance of the Global Compact on Migration is indisputable.
First of all, it is significant that States explicitly declare in this 
document: “we aim to facilitate68) safe, orderly and regular 
migration”69). And this is not an isolated statement: the verb 
“to facilitate”, or words deriving from the verb, appear all of 62 
times in the text of the Migration Compact. Thus, as pointed 
out70), States recognize “that facilitating mobility over time will 
be the best way to govern it: to take maximum advantage of 
its economic, social, and cultural benefits, while also meeting 
its challenges”.
Finally, it seems to me to be extremely important to highlight 
once again the words of para. 4 of the Migration Compact, 
namely “Refugees and migrants are entitled to the same uni-
versal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which must 
be respected, protected and fulfilled at all times”, since this 
pays the best tribute to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and is particularly valuable in the delicate historical 
moment we are experiencing. Indeed the rights of migrants 
and refugees are being trampled on more than ever in every 
part of the globe (on the one hand, Trump’s migration policy, 
the so-called Australian Pacific Solution, the Rohingya crisis 
in Asia spring to mind; on the other, with specific reference to 
Europe, the measures adopted by Orbán in Hungary, the Italian 
policy of closed ports, as well as the evolution of externaliza-
tion). In such a context, this straightforward commitment in 
favour of human rights “could not be taken for granted”, as 
rightly pointed out71).
However, the real success of this compact will depend on 
the concrete will of the States to move from words to action: 
indeed, in the words of the pact, “the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration is a milestone, but not the end 
to our efforts”72).
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